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During its 1984 and 1985 sessions, the General Assembly enacted
a number of minor technical amendments to Virginia's Uniform
Commercial Code. These included both the much-needed and
long-awaited change of the word "state" to "Commonwealth"
throughout the Code and a series of inexplicable revisions in the
Code's punctuation. The most significant of these technical
changes was undoubtedly the increase in the filing fees for Article
9 financing statements filed with the State Corporation Commis-
sion.1 (One substantial legislative change which indirectly affects
the Code was the enactment of Virginia's new "Lemon Law." Some
aspects of that statute are discussed below in conjunction with the
Virginia Supreme Court's recent decision on the standards for rev-
ocation of acceptance of a lemon car.)
Of vastly greater importance than the technical changes to the
U.C.C. was Virginia's adoption of the Code's 1977 Official Amend-
ments (the "1977 Amendments"). The 1977 Amendments primar-
ily affect Article 8 (Investment Securities). Although Article 8 is
among the most obscure,2 and least litigated,3 articles of the Code,
the 1977 Amendments may eventually have a very substantial im-
pact on the one aspect of investment securities law that can be
significant to the typical commercial lawyer-the creation and
perfection of security interests in investment securities.
* Associate Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond;
B.A., 1974, John Carroll University;, J.D., 1977, University of Michigan. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the research assistance of John L. Squires, T.C. Williams School of Law,
University of Richmond, Class of 1987.
1. From $5.00 to $10.00. Act of April 18, 1984, ch. 771, 1984 Va. Acts 2093 (codified at VA.
CODE AN. § 8.9-403(5) (Cum. Supp. 1985)).
2. So obscure that the writers of the leading treatise in the field decided to ignore it. J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE at xxi
(2d ed. 1980).
3. There appears to be exactly one reported Virginia case that even refers to Article 8-In
re Mathews, 25 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 305 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Mathews v.
Starr, 475 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Va. 1979).
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Traditionally, the law regarding the creation and transfer of in-
terests in investment securities has closely paralleled the law re-
garding negotiable instruments. A traditional investment security,
like a draft or a note, consists of rights embodied in a piece of
paper. Generally speaking, the transfer of that piece of paper, if
accompanied by any necessary endorsement, transfers the rights it
embodies, free of the claims of third parties.4 The attributes of ne-
gotiability given to investment securities have facilitated the crea-
tion of a highly efficient market in those securities. Buyers do not
have to research the title to the securities they obtain, since merely
by taking possession of the crucial piece of paper they are, gener-
ally speaking, assured of obtaining clear title to the underlying
rights.
However, the same technological changes which are affecting ne-
gotiable instruments are also affecting investment interests., Our
society is moving from a reliance upon paper to a faith in elec-
tronic data storage as the embodiment of intangible rights. Indeed,
it has long been true that many investment interests are not repre-
sented by paper securities held by the owner of the rights. A com-
mon and popular example is shares of stock held in a stock rein-
vestment plan. The issuer of the shares acts as custodian of the
shares for the owner, and typically the only documentation re-
ceived by the owner is a periodic statement. The owner may, but
rarely does, get a certificate issued for the shares.
The increasing popularity of such devices created a problem for
secured creditors who wished to use these "paperless" investment
interests as collateral. Prior to the 1977 Amendments, a security
interest in an investment security could only be perfected by tak-
ing possession of the security.6 This in turn meant that a certificate
had to be issued. While this problem does not appear to have cre-
ated an insuperable barrier to the use of paperless investment in-
terests as collateral (the owner/debtor merely had to get the issuer
4. See generally U.C.C. §§ 8-301, -302, -304, -305, -308, -309, -311, -313 (1972). (In this
article, all citations to the pre-1977 Amendments version of the U.C.C. are to the Official
1972 Text. All other cites are to the current Virginia version of the Code.) With regard to
the negotiable nature of securities under the 1972 Code generally, see 3 R. ANDERSON, AN-
DERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 717-24, 726-32, 742-57, 760-70 (2d ed. 1971).
5. Either to avoid or to engender confusion, this article uses the term "investment inter-
ests" to describe collectively what new Article 8 calls certificated and uncertificated securi-
ties. This is because, except in those states that have adopted the 1977 Amendments, an
uncertificated security is not a security.
6. U.C.C. §§ 8-102, 9-105(i), 9-304 (1972).
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to give him/her a certificate), it did add significantly to the
"paperwork crunch" that was burdening the securities market.7
It was suggested that this problem could have been adequately
resolved by dealing with paperless investment interests as either
"accounts" or "general intangibles" under Article 9.8 A security in-
terest in an account or other intangible can be perfected rather
easily by the mere filing of a financing statement.9 However, the
majority of those involved in drafting the 1977 Amendments op-
posed this idea. They wished to retain the attributes of negotiabil-
ity for paperless investment interests. Those attributes would be
lost if the interests were treated as accounts or general intangibles
because a transferee of the interest could not rely upon transfer
and endorsement; he/she would have to check the U.C.C. records
to determine whether he/she was getting clear title.10
In consequence, new Article 8 creates what can only be described
as a negotiable intangible-dubbed the "uncertificated security.""
The drafters realized that sufficient protection could be provided
both to buyers and to secured parties by the simple device of pro-
tecting only those interests in the uncertificated security which
were "registered" with the issuer. By registering a security interest
with the issuer of the security, a secured party obtains protection
against later buyers. Conversely, a buyer is generally assured of ob-
taining clear title against any interests that have not been regis-
tered.12 The buyer is thus relieved of the potentially difficult task
of tracking down a financing statement; the uncertificated security
is as freely transferable as the traditional certificated security; and
the highly efficient market associated with negotiability is
preserved.
It should be noted, however, that, in establishing this new struc-
ture for using securities as collateral, the drafters of the new Arti-
cle 8 seem to have made a serious political blunder which may be
slowing the Article's adoption. The creation and perfection (though
not the enforcement) of security interests in all investment securi-
ties will now be governed primarily by Article 8 rather than by
7. See generally Aronstein, Haydock & Scott, Article 8 Is Ready, 93 HAav. L. REV. 889,
890-92 (1980).
8. Id. at 891 n.8, 895-96.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-302(1) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
10. Aronstein, Haydock & Scott, supra note 7, at 895-98.
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.8-102(b) (Cur. Supp. 1985).
12. Id. §§ 8.8-302, -313, -321; Aronstein, Haydock & Scott, supra note 7, at 897-99.
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Article 9. This has already miffed at least one of Article 9's guiding
spirits.13 (It is also worth mentioning that, for no very obvious rea-
son, new Article 8 continues the archaic, and, in the context of un-
certificated securities, misleading,14 term "pledge" to describe the
security interest 5 and "pledgee" to describe the secured party.)'
Under section 8.8-321(1), a security interest in a security is en-
forceable and can attach only if the security is "transferred" either
to the secured party or to a person designated by the secured
party.17 (Note that transfer is required both to create and perfect
the security interest; thus, there is now no such thing as an un-
perfected security interest in securities, except in those cases
where perfection has lapsed.) Section 8.8-313(1) sets out an ex-
haustive list of the means by which a transfer can be effectuated.
Generally, however, a certificated security is transferred by the
transfer of possession; an uncertificated security is transferred by
"registration."18 Registration of a security interest in an uncertifi-
13. Namely, Professor Peter F. Coogan, who has expressed his strong disapproval. See
Coogan, Security Interests in Investment Securities Under Revised Article 8 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1013 (1979).
14. Since, after all, "pledge" has traditionally implied possession, the very requirement
being abolished by new Article 8.
15. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.8-313(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
16. See, e.g., id. § 8.8-308(7)(b).
17. Section 8.8-321(1) reads as follows: "A security interest in a security is enforceable
and can attach only if it is transferred to the secured party or a person designated by him
pursuant to a provision of subsection (1) of §8.8-313." Id. § 8.8-321(1).
18. Section 8.8-313(1) reads as follows:
Transfer of a security or a limited interest (including a security interest) therein to a
purchaser occurs only:
(a) at the time he or a person designated by him acquires possession of a certifi-
cated security; or
(b) at the time the transfer, pledge or release of an uncertificated security is
registered to him or a person designated by him; or
(c) at the time his financial intermediary acquires possession of a certificated
security specially indorsed to or issued in the name of the purchaser; or
(d) at the time a financial intermediary, not a clearing corporation, sends him
confirmation of the purchase and also by book entry or otherwise identifies as be-
longing to the purchaser
(i) a specific certificated security in the financial intermediary's possession; or
(ii) a quantity of securities that constitute or are part of a fungible bulk of cer-
tificated securities in the financial intermediary's possession or of uncertificated
securities registered in the name of the financial intermediary; or
(iii) a quantity of securities that constitute or are part of a fungible bulk of
securities shown on the account of the financial intermediary on the books of an-
other financial intermediary;
(e) with respect to an identified certificated security to be delivered while still in
the possession of a third person, not a financial intermediary, at the time that per-
son acknowledges that he holds for the purchaser;
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cated security is accomplished by an "instruction," which is de-
fined as "an order to the issuer of an uncertificated security re-
questing that the transfer, pledge, or release from pledge of the
uncertificated security specified therein shall be registered."19 To
be binding on the issuer, the instruction must be given by or on
behalf of the registered owner to create the security interest, or by
or on behalf of the "registered pledgee" (the secured party) to re-
lease the security interest.20 Ordinarily, the instruction must be in
writing and signed.21 Only one security interest in any uncertifi-
cated security can be registered at any given time.2 This, of
course, means that there is no such thing as a junior security inter-
est in an uncertificated security. Consequently, any creditor who
wishes to obtain a subordinate interest in an uncertificated secur-
ity can do so only by getting the registered pledgee to make a side
agreement to give the junior creditor some part of the proceeds
upon liquidation. The security interest, when registered, is auto-
(f) with respect to a specific uncertificated security the pledge or transfer of
which has been registered to a third person, not a financial intermediary, when that
person acknowledges that he holds for the purchaser;
(g) at the time appropriate entries to the account of the purchaser or a person
designated by him on the books of a clearing corporation are made under § 8.8-320;
(h) with respect to the debtor of a security interest where the debtor has signed
a security agreement containing a description of the security, at the time a written
notification, which, in the case of the creation of a security interest, is signed by the
debtor (which may be a copy of the security agreement) or which, in the case of the
release or assignment of the security interest created pursuant to this subsection, is
signed by the secured party is received by
(i) a financial intermediary on whose books the interest of the transferor in the
security appears; or
(ii) a third person, not a financial intermediary, in possession of the security, if
it is certificated; or
(iii) a third person, not a financial intermediary, who is the registered owner of
the security, if it is uncertificated and not subject to a registered pledge; or
(iv) a third person, not a financial intermediary, who is the registered pledgee
of the security, if it is uncertificated and subject to a registered pledge;
(i) with respect to the transfer of a security interest where the transferor has
signed a security agreement which contains a description of the security, when new
value is given by the secured party; or
(j) with respect to the transfer of a security interest where the secured party is a
financial intermediary and the security has already been transferred to the finan-
cial intermediary under paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), or (g), at the time the trans-
feror has signed a security agreement containing a description of the security and
value is given by the secured party.
Id. § 8.8-313(1).
19. Id. § 8.8-308(4).
20. Id. § 8.8-308(7), (8).
21. Id. § 8.8-308(5).
22. Id. § 8.8-108.
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matically perfected, and there is generally no time limit on the
length of perfection.2
It remains to be seen whether the new Article 8 will be as signifi-
cant as its drafters hoped. To date, only a handful of states have
adopted it. 24 Moreover, it may take many years before issuers, in-
vestors and lenders, who are accustomed to, and comfortable with,
the present system will be equally comfortable with uncertificated
securities. The Article's method of dealing with uncertificated se-
curities is, however, a remarkably simple and ingenious response to
the replacement of paper securities with paperless investment in-
terests. Merely by informing the issuer of a security interest, the
secured party can protect that interest at no cost to the security's
negotiability.
II. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
A. Virginia Supreme Court
The Virginia Supreme Court decided only a handful of Uniform
Commercial Code cases during 1984-85. This, unfortunately, is not
aberrational. The scantiness of commercial law precedents has
made the commonwealth relatively insignificant in the develop-
ment of modern American commercial law.
The most important Virginia Supreme Court case was undoubt-
edly Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., Inc., 25 in which the court
made its first excursion into the troubled issue of "lemon cars."
Buyers of lemon cars have long sought, and frequently obtained,
relief under Article 2, using one or more of several theories. Some
buyers of lemon cars have been able to "reject" the defective car,
sometimes after driving it for a considerable period of time, and
get their money back.26 Others have been able to "revoke accept-
ance," usually on the ground of substantial, latent defects.2 7 Of
course, most contracts for the sale of a car include a limitation of
the remedies available for breach, generally to repair or replace-
23. Id. § 8.8-321(2), (3), (4).
24. However, it is significant that Delaware is among them. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §
8-101 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
25. 227 Va. 154, 313 S.E.2d 384 (1984).
26. See, e.g., Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (Law
Div. 1968).




ment of the car at the seller's option. Such limitations would ordi-
narily preclude rejection or revocation, but, with regard to lemon
cars, they have been widely ignored by the courts. A common ra-
tionale used by the courts is that if the seller cannot repair the
defects, the limited remedy has "failed of its essential purpose,"
and the buyer is thereby entitled to use the full range of remedies
given by the Code28 The Gasque case explores only one aspect of
lemon car law-the ability of the buyer of a lemon to revoke
acceptance.
The facts of the case indicate that the Gasques' car was only a
moderately sour lemon. The automobile was not wholly or even
virtually inoperable, as has been true in some lemon car cases; 29
however, it was plagued with significant and bothersome defects.
These included, among others, a water leak, a loose gear shift lever,
poor shifting, a malfunctioning heater, an inoperative clock, choke
difficulties, excessive oil consumption, vibration, noise and rat-
tles.30 The car was a new one, purchased by the Gasques on Febru-
ary 21, 1979; it was returned to the seller for repairs on March 13,
March 23, an undetermined day in May, June 22, June 27, July 20,
and August 6.31 Finally, on September 19, 1979, the Gasques' at-
torney wrote both to Mooers and to the manufacturer (Fiat) de-
manding either a full refund or the replacement of the automobile.
However, the Gasques did not return the car to Mooers; they con-
tinued to drive it. When their refund/replacement demand was not
met, the Gasques sued in equity for "rescission" of the contract or
replacement of the car, plus punitive damages.3 2 This relief was
denied by the circuit court, and its decision was affirmed by the
supreme court.
Since it appears that both the buyers and the seller assumed
that the car had been "accepted," the only question before the
court was whether, under these circumstances, the buyers could re-
voke their acceptance. The Code provision upon which the buyers
relied was section 8.2-608, which states, in pertinent part, that "the
buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose
nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has ac-
cepted it . . .without discovery of such nonconformity if his ac-
28. See, e.g., Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1971).
29. See, e.g., Zabriskie Chevrolet, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195.
30. Gasque, 227 Va. at 158, 313 S.E.2d at 387.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 157, 313 S.E.2d at 387.
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ceptance was reasonably induced. . . by the difficulty of discovery
before acceptance" and further that "[r]evocation of acceptance
must occur within a reasonable time."33
The court examined two aspects of revocation under section 8.2-
608. First, it considered the meaning of the "to him" in the phrase
"substantially impairs its value to him." The question was whether
or not this phrase created a wholly subjective standard of substan-
tial impairment, i.e., was the buyer's personal dissatisfaction suffi-
cient to constitute substantial impairment? The supreme court
ruled that, although the language of the Code may suggest a sub-
jective standard, it creates what the court called an objective stan-
dard. 4 In fact, a close reading of the case indicates that the stan-
dard is partly subjective and partly objective. It is subjective to the
extent that the goods must be suitable for the buyer's particular
use. In other words, if the Gasques had some "unusual and special
purpose" for the car, the goods would have to be fit for that pur-
pose.3 5 On the other hand, the goods must be "objectively" un-
suited for the purpose the buyer does have. Since, in the court's
view, the Gasques' purpose in buying the car was merely to have
"simple transportation," and since the car did indeed provide sim-
ple transportation, the defects did not substantially impair the
value of the car. 6 The court rejected two out-of-state cases that it
saw as creating a wholly subjective standard of substantial impair-
ment (although it should be noted that a close reading of those
cases indicates that they are quite reconcilable with Gasque).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-608 (Repl. Vol. 1965).
34. Gasque, 227 Va. at 160, 313 S.E.2d at 388-89.
35. Id. at 160, 313 S.E.2d at 389. Unfortunately, the phrasing used by the court may lead
to some confusion of the standard for substantial impairment under § 8.2-608 with the stan-
dard for creating an implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose under § 8.2-315. The
mere fact that goods do not do what the buyer wants them to do does not mean that the
seller is in breach of contract. A buyer who has some unusual need must make that known
to the seller to have the benefit of the particular purpose warranty. Id. Thus, Gasque should
have said that if the seller is in breach of contract and the breach is such that it (objec-
tively) substantially impairs the (subjective) value of the goods to the buyer, the buyer may,
in proper circumstances, revoke acceptance.
36. Id. at 160-61, 313 S.E.2d at 389.
37. Indeed, it is not really clear that any court actually uses a subjective test to measure
"substantial impairment." See J. WHrtE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 308-09. The
Gasque court cited two cases as examples of a subjective standard of substantial impair-
ment-Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 Ill. App. 3d 530, 358 N.E.2d 382 (1976) and
Zabriskie Chevrolet, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195. Unfortunately, neither case is espe-
cially relevant. In Stamm, the court held that a number of annoying, but not fatal, defects
in a motor home did not give the buyer the right to revoke acceptance; it is thus virtually
identical to Gasque. Zabriskie Chevrolet is not even a revocation case; it deals with the
[Vol. 19:717
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This aspect of the Gasque case may be affected by Virginia's
adoption of a so-called "lemon law." Under sections 59.1-207.9 to
-207.14 of the Code of Virginia,38 the rights of a consumer pur-
chaser of a motor vehicle to enforce express warranties have been
greatly expanded. For example, if the motor vehicle does not con-
form to the express warranties and the nonconformity is reported
during the year following its purchase, "the manufacturer, its
agent, or its authorized dealer" must make appropriate repairs,
even if the repairs have to be made after the expiration of the one
year period 39 (which presumably means after the expiration of the
usual one year warranty). More significant to those in the Gasques'
position, the buyer has a right to obtain a refund of the purchase
price or replacement of the vehicle if there is a defect which "sig-
nificantly impairs" the vehicle's "use, market value, or safety" and
cannot be repaired after "a reasonable number of attempts."40
Whether the lemon law would have changed the outcome in
Gasque is unclear. The right to repair or replacement under the
lemon law is contingent on a defect that "significantly impairs" the
vehicle. The Virginia Supreme Court certainly could read this lan-
guage to be less demanding than the "substantially impairs" lan-
guage of the Uniform Commercial Code; unfortunately, there is
nothing in the lemon law which directly addresses this issue or
which even defines the phrase "significantly impairs."41
The second revocation question examined by the court was
whether the Code's procedures for revocation had been followed.
seller's right to cure a defective tender. The car at issue in Zabriskie Chevrolet just barely
got out of the showroom and declined to move at more than five to ten miles per hour. 99
N.J. Super. at , 240 A.2d at 197. The seller attempted to cure this by replacing the car's
transmission with a used, reconditioned transmission of "unknown lineage." Id. at _ 240
A.2d at 205. The New Jersey court held that this was an inadequate cure. Id. The magni-
tude of the underlying defect would surely have permitted revocation even under the
Gasque rule.
38. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-207.10 to -207.14 (Cum. Supp. 1985). A much more comprehen-
sive review of the Lemon Law can be found in Comment, Virginia's Lemon Law: The Best
Treatment For Car Owner's Canker?, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 405 (1985).
39. Id. § 59.1-207.12.
40. Id. § 59.1-207.13. The section creates a presumption that a "reasonable number of
attempts" have been made to fix the vehicle if, during the year after it was purchased, either
the same nonconformity has been subject to repair four or more times or (with some excep-
tions) if the vehicle is out of service to repair it for a cumulative total of thirty calendar
days. Id. § 59.1-207.13(B).
41. See generally Gayle, Virginia's Lemon Law: More Bark than Bite?, 33 VA. B. NEWS,
Oct. 1984, 11, 13-14. Unfortunately, the author of that article completely ignores the possi-
bly significant difference in wording between the operative portions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the Virginia Lemon Law.
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The Gasques' problem was that they had continued to use the car
after giving notice of revocation and, indeed, to the time of trial.
The Gasques gave notice of revocation to Mooers on September 19,
1979, but continued to drive the car until at least May 21, 1980,
during which time they put an additional two thousand six hun-
dred miles on the car.42 The supreme court held that this contin-
ued use meant that the Gasques' attempted revocation was ineffec-
tive.43 While the court indicated, in dicta, that a widely followed
exception to this "no use" rule for buyers of mobile homes would
be applied in Virginia, it also held that such an exception had no
applicability to the continued use of an automobile. The court dis-
tinguished the mobile home cases on two grounds-first, the com-
pelling need of the revoking buyer for shelter; and second, the fact
that continued occupancy of a mobile home "might be the best
means of safeguarding the property," while continued use of an au-
tomobile causes further depreciation in value.44
It is unclear whether the lemon law will affect this part of the
Gasque decision. The lemon law does not have any express re-
quirement that the buyer cease to use the car once the right to
refund/replacement accrues,45 which certainly suggests that there
is no such requirement. Moreover, the consumer who obtains a re-
fund under the lemon law is only entitled to refund of the
purchase price "less a reasonable allowance for the consumer's use
of the vehicle. '46 This "implied rent" provision provides a very
42. Gasque, 227 Va. at 161, 313 S.E.2d at 389.
43. Id. at 162, 313 S.E.2d at 390. The court was careful to note, however, that the initial
revocation was made within a reasonable time; only that the buyers' continued use, being
"inconsistent with their position as bailee," had the effect of nullifying the revocation. Id.
44. Id. at 162, 313 S.E.2d at 389-90.
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.13 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
46. The relevant provision reads as follows:
If the manufacturer, its agents or authorized dealers do not conform the motor vehi-
cle to any applicable express warranty by repairing or correcting any defect or condi-
tion which significantly impairs the use, market value, or safety of the motor vehicle
to the consumer after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall:...
[a]ccept return of the motor vehicle and refund to the consumer and any lienholder
...the full purchase price, including all collateral charges, less a reasonable allow-
ance for the consumer's use of the vehicle. The subtraction of a reasonable allowance
for use shall apply when either a replacement or a refund of the motor vehicle occurs.
A reasonable allowance for use shall not exceed one-half of the amount allowed per
mile by the Internal Revenue Service, as provided by regulation, revenue procedure,
or revenue ruling promulgated pursuant to § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, for
use of a personal vehicle for business purposes, plus an amount to account for any
loss to the fair market value of the vehicle resulting from damages beyond normal
wear and tear, unless the damage resulted from nonconformity to an express war-
[Vol. 19:717
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strong reason for not imposing a "no use" requirement. Much of
the purpose of that requirement is to protect the seller, who ordi-
narily must return the full purchase price, from the penalty of re-
funding the buyer's full cost for what are now used goods. Indeed,
the cases which have created an exception to the "no use" rule for
buyers of defective mobile homes have also required that the re-
voking buyer pay the seller a fair rental for the continued use of
the goods.47 Thus, since the interests of the seller are adequately
protected by the lemon law's "rent" requirement, a buyer seeking
refund rather than revocation under the provisions of Article 2
should not be precluded from getting the refund by his/her use of
the motor vehicle.48
In addition to providing Virginia attorneys with some guidance
on revocation in general and lemon cars in particular, Gasque also
made it clear that a buyer need not choose between revocation and
damages. Indeed, the court strongly indicated that the Gasques
could have recovered damages, perhaps even punitive damages, but
for the curious fact that the plaintiffs did not request compensa-
tory damages.49 Unlike prior law, the Uniform Commercial Code
does not require that an election be made between the equitable
relief of revocation/rescission and the recovery of money dam-
ages.50 The plaintiff could thus have sued for both and at least ob-
tained what the Code refers to as "damages for breach in regard to
accepted goods."5 1 Those attorneys representing buyers of lemon
cars should thus be careful to join a demand for damages with a
request for revocation.
The remaining supreme court cases are relatively unremarkable.
In Allsbrook v. Azalea Radiator Service, Inc.,52 the court merely
noted that the sale of a service company is not subject to the bulk
transfer provisions of Article 6, which apply only to the sale of
companies that are primarily in the business of selling goods from
ranty. Mileage, expenses, and reasonable loss of use necessitated by attempts to con-
form such motor vehicle to the express warranty may be recovered by the consumer.
Id. § 59.1-207.13(A)(2).
47. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Modem Mobile Homes, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978).
48. But, of course, the buyer would have to pay the "rent" for such continued use under
§ 59.1-207.13(A)(2); see supra note 46.
49. Gasque, 227 Va. at 159, 313 S.E.2d at 388.
50. Id.
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-714 (Add. Vol. 1965).
52. 227 Va. 600, 316 S.E.2d 743 (1984).
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inventory. In United Virginia Bank v. E.L.B. Tank Construction,
Inc.,53 the court ruled that, when one person deposits money in a
bank to the credit of another with the consent of that other per-
son, the person to whose credit the deposit was made is deemed to
be the "depositor" for determining his/her rights, and the bank's
responsibilities, under Article 4 of the Code. Of somewhat more
interest is Flowers Baking Co. v. R-P Packaging, Inc. 4 In that
case, Kearns Bakery of Virginia, Inc. (Kearns) had been engaged
with R-P in the development of a new plastic wrap for Kearns's
products. Prior to the completion of this development, Kearns sold
all its assets to Flowers. The court held that, even though Kearns
and R-P had exchanged both an order and an acknowledgment
form, no contract existed between them because the clear intent of
the parties was that no contract come into existence until the
dimensions and design of the cellophane wrap had been approved
by Kearns.55 Since Flowers, not Kearns, ultimately approved the
design, R-P's contract was with Flowers.5" Flowers also asserted
that the contract with R-P was unenforceable under the Article 2
Statute of Frauds, apparently because the only writings evidencing
the contract were the Kearns and R-P forms.57 The court rejected
this argument on the basis of the Code's exception for specially
manufactured goods, reasoning that plastic wrap which had been
designed for, and bore the name of, a specific buyer was specially
manufactured.5 8 Finally, the court rejected Flowers' contention
that it had properly rejected the goods, ruling that a buyer claim-
ing rightful rejection on the ground of nonconformity to the con-
tract has the burden of proving the nonconformity. 59
B. Fourth Circuit
The most significant Fourth Circuit case interpreting Virginia's
Uniform Commercial Code is unfortunately an unpublished
53. 226 Va. 551, 311 S.E.2d 773 (1984).
54. 229 Va. 370, 329 S.E.2d 462 (1985).
55. Id. at 375-76, 329 S.E.2d at 465-66. It should also be noted that the acknowledgment
by R-P was issued after the sale of Kearns's assets to Flowers. Id. at 373, 329 S.E.2d at 464.
56. Id. at 373-76, 329 S.E.2d at 464-66. The dimensions of the wrap were never tested by
Flowers, nor does there appear to have been any express approval of them. However, Flow-
ers' plant manager did tell R-P that the wrap was satisfactory and told R-P to "[p]roceed
with the order." Id. at 373-74, 329 S.E.2d at 464. The manager did expressly approve the
design. Id.
57. Id. at 376-77, 329 S.E.2d at 466.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 378-79, 329 S.E.2d at 467.
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one-E.W.G. Corp. v. TWI, Inc.6  E.W.G. Corp. is one of the very
few Virginia cases exploring the much-litigated question of the ad-
equacy of collateral descriptions under Article 9. Some years ago,
the Fourth Circuit ruled that the phrase "accounts receivable" was
a sufficiently detailed description of that type of collateral."' In
E.W.G. Corp., the court held that the phrases "assets" or "corpo-
rate assets" used in a financing statement were not sufficient to
perfect a security interest in a tax refund.2 The common thread of
these two holdings is that "account" is a category of collateral spe-
cifically defined by Article 9, while "assets" and "corporate assets"
are not defined. The Code requires that, in a financing statement,
collateral descriptions be by "type or item. '6 3 "Type," in the
Fourth Circuit's view at least, seems to mean a description that is
at least as specific as the Code-defined categories of collateral. The
Code-created category into which tax refunds fit is "general in-
tangibles"; 4 that is thus the broadest description which would be
sufficient to describe a tax refund.
E.W.G. Corp. is in line with most decisions on this question
throughout the country. Presumably, therefore, the Virginia Su-
preme Court would follow similar reasoning. It is thus probably
safe to use "blanket" collateral descriptions that track the catego-
ries in the Code, but not to use completely open-ended descrip-
tions such as "all assets" or "all property."
Three other Fourth Circuit cases are of some interest. In United
States v. Kellerman,6 5 the court held, en route to acquitting a de-
fendant accused of misappropriating assets, that a bank holding a
check as escrow agent for the drawer is not a holder of the check,
even if the check is payable to the bank. Since the bank was not a
holder of the check, it could not, of course, be a holder in due
course of the check; since the bank was not a holder in due course,
the check (which was subject to a defense of the drawer) was
worthless to it; and since the check was worthless, the fortunate
Kellerman had not misappropriated an asset.6 6 In Otto Gerdau Co.
60. 39 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1031 (4th Cir. 1984).
61. In re Varney Wood Prods., Inc., 458 F.2d 435 (4th Cir. 1972).
62. E.W.G. Corp., 39 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1032-33.
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-402(1) (Cum. Supp. 1985); see also id. § 8.9-203 (Add. Vol. 1965
& Supp. 1984).
64. E.W.G. Corp., 39 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1033.
65. 729 F.2d 281 (4th Cir. 1984).
66. Id. at 284-85.
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v. Lamberts Point Docks, Inc.,67 the court, relying upon both Arti-
cle 7 and pre-Code Virginia law, held that a bailor establishes a
prima facie case of negligence against a warehouseman by showing
that goods were delivered to the warehouseman in good condition
and returned to the bailor in damaged condition. The warehouse-
man then carries the burden of persuasion, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that it exercised due care in dealing with the goods.6 8
Finally, in a products liability case of some residual interest but
continuously diminishing importance, Farish v. Courion Industries
Inc.,'9 the court, en banc, decided that Virginia's version of section
2-31870 (which limits the availability of the defense of privity) does
not apply with regard to goods sold before its effective date (June
29, 1962).71
C. Other Courts
One United States district court case is worth mentioning. In
Wise v. General Motors Corp.,72 the Western District court ruled
that there could ordinarily be no recovery under Article 2 for
mental suffering and emotional distress.73 The court, however, in-
dicated that there would be an exception to this rule in cases
where serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result
of the breach.7 4 Interestingly, the court relied heavily on the Re-
statement of Contracts in reaching its decision. 5
67. 733 F.2d 343 (4th Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 345-46.
69. 754 F.2d 1111 (4th Cir. 1985).
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Repl. Vol. 1965) states:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any action
brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages for breach of
warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not
purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manu-
facturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by
the goods; however, this section shall not be construed to affect any litigation pending
on June twenty-nine, nineteen hundred sixty-two.
71. Farish, 754 F.2d at 1114-18.
72. 588 F. Supp. 1207 (W.D. Va. 1984).
73. Id. at 1208-10.
74. Id. at 1210-11.
75. Id. at 1211-12.
